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I. INTRODUCTION
The primary purpose of this Article is to evaluate the four most
recent Supreme Court decisions on personal jurisdiction and situate
those decisions within the history of Supreme Court personal jurisdic* William V. Dorsaneo, III, Chief Justice John and Lena Hickman Distinguished
Faculty Fellow and Professor of Law, Dedman School of Law, Southern Methodist
University. An earlier version of this Article was submitted to the appellate judges,
lawyers, and staff attorneys at the eleventh annual Appellate Judges Education Institute (“AJEI”) Summit in Dallas, Texas, on November 13–16, 2014, in connection with
a panel discussion. The panel members were the Honorable Wallace B. Jefferson,
Chief Justice, Texas Supreme Court (ret.), the Honorable Jennifer Elrod, U.S. Court
of Appeals, Fifth Circuit, and Professor Alexandra W. Albright, Professor of Law,
University of Texas School of Law. Professor Dorsaneo acted as the moderator for
the panel presentation. For helpful comments on prior drafts of this Article, in addition to the panel members, I thank Meghan Ryan and Anthony Colangelo. I also
want to thank Katya Long, J.D. Candidate (2016), for her assistance in preparing this
Article for publication.
DOI: https://doi.org/10.37419/LR.V3.I1.1
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tion jurisprudence. Starting with the seminal case of Pennoyer v.
Neff,1 personal jurisdiction jurisprudence has been remarkably kaleidoscopic, with the Supreme Court intervening at various intervals to
redefine the law in broad strokes, while zigzagging from one doctrinal
position to another and thereby leaving lower courts to hash out the
application of an evolving personal jurisdiction doctrine to varying
fact patterns. I will divide this jurisprudential history into two main
groups of cases after Pennoyer was superseded by the modern minimum contacts approach. The first group of decisions begins with International Shoe Co. v. Washington2 and continues through Hanson v.
Denckla.3 The second group begins almost two decades later with
Shaffer v. Heitner4 and continues through Asahi Metal Industry Co. v.
Superior Court5 and Burnham v. Superior Court.6
The first group of post-Pennoyer decisions initially substituted the
“minimum contacts” doctrine for the rules developed under Pennoyer’s reign and then attempted to clarify and explain the doctrine,
but this group of decisions ended in confusion, particularly with respect to the impact of the concept of “purposeful availment.” Likewise, during the second period, real progress was made by the
unification of the in personam and in rem wings of Pennoyer v. Neff
and by the reformulation of the minimum contacts doctrine into a
more user-friendly framework, but the second period also ended in
uncertainty resulting from disagreement among the members of the
Supreme Court on the scope of purposeful availment.
After each of these two groups of decisions, the Supreme Court retired from the field, and the lower federal courts and the state courts
were required to finish the due process analysis themselves. Thus far,
the third group of cases begins with the Court’s fractured opinions in
J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro7 and continues with its unanimous opinion in Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown,8
the Court’s nearly unanimous opinion in Daimler AG v. Bauman,9
and ends with its unanimous opinion in Walden v. Fiore.10
This third group of decisions has severely limited the scope of general personal jurisdiction, but has not only not resolved interpretive
problems with the scope of specific jurisdiction, but instead has exac1. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877). For an informative discussion of this case
and its notable protagonists, see Wendy Collins Purdue, Sin, Scandal, and Substantive
Due Process: Personal Jurisdiction and Pennoyer Reconsidered, 62 WASH. L. REV. 479
(1987).
2. Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
3. Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958).
4. Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
5. Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102 (1987).
6. Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604 (1990).
7. J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780 (2011).
8. Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846 (2011).
9. Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746 (2014).
10. Walden v. Fiore, 134 S. Ct. 1115 (2014).
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erbated these problems while making very little progress in resolving
how issues of extraterritoriality should be resolved in the era of
globalization and electronic commerce.
II. PERSONAL JURISDICTION AND DUE PROCESS BEFORE
INTERNATIONAL SHOE
The landmark personal jurisdiction case decided in the nineteenth
century is Pennoyer v. Neff.11 Pennoyer established rigid rules for the
exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction over the person or property of
nonresidents. Under Pennoyer’s regime, absent consent by “voluntary
appearance,” the appointment of “an agent or representative in the
State to receive service of process,” or the implied designation of a
“public officer” on whom “service may be made,”12 as required by a
long-arm statute:
• “[N]o State can exercise direct jurisdiction and authority over
persons or property without its territory.”13
• “[N]o tribunal established by it can extend its process beyond
that territory so as to subject either persons or property to its
decisions.”14
The rationale behind this approach rests on the following “principles of public law” that were incorporated into the newly enacted Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment:
• “[E]very State possesses exclusive jurisdiction and sovereignty
over persons and property within its territory.”15
• “The several states are of equal dignity and authority, and the
independence of one implies the exclusion of power from all
others. . . . [T]he laws of one State have no operation outside its
territory, except so far as allowed by comity.”16
Under Pennoyer’s in rem wing, the attachment of the defendant’s
property within the forum sufficiently supported the exercise of in
rem or quasi in rem jurisdiction over the nonresident property
owner.17 This jurisdiction was limited to the extent of the nonresi11.
12.
13.
14.

Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
Id. at 726, 735.
Id. at 722.
Id.; see also JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS, FOREIGN AND DOMESTIC, IN REGARD TO MARRIAGES, DIVORCES, WILLS, SUCCESSIONS,
AND JUDGMENTS 754 (Melville M. Bigelow ed., 8th ed. 1883).
15. Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 722.
16. Id.
17. As Professor Charles W. Rhodes explains:
[T]he court in Pennoyer v. Neff, while adopting a rule generally equating a
court’s jurisdictional reach with the physical presence of a person or properly attached property within the forum, also cautioned that its holding
would not preclude a state from exercising jurisdiction over a divorce action
brought by a state citizen against a nonresident. . . .
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dent’s interest in the property when the property was properly subjected to the jurisdiction of the forum court.18 According to the First
Restatement of Judgments, a judgment in rem affected the interests of
all persons in the property while a judgment quasi in rem affected the
interests of particular persons in designated property.19 More significantly, from the standpoint of jurisdiction over nonresident property
owners’ interests in such property, however, was the fact that the second type of quasi in rem jurisdiction did not require the resident
plaintiff to have any preexisting claim to an interest in the subject
property.20 In this case the only relationship between the property
subjected to jurisdiction and the claim asserted against the nonresident was the defendant’s ownership of property in the forum state.
The dispute did not need any relationship to the property.21 The heart
of this jurisdictional principle was that, with respect to litigation that
otherwise had nothing to do with the property, the nonresident’s
property could be captured and held hostage through the exercise of
legal process directed at the property.22 As explained below, the second type of quasi in rem jurisdiction was eliminated in 1977.23

Courts subsequently developed other exceptions similarly allowing jurisdictional assertions based on the type of dispute rather than a general adjudicative power over the individual defendant. The most notable of these
doctrines was the concept of implied consent.
Charles W. “Rocky” Rhodes, The Predictability Principle in Personal Jurisdiction
Doctrine: A Case Study on the Effects of a “Generally” Too Broad, but “Specifically”
Too Narrow Approach to Minimum Contacts, 57 BAYLOR L. REV. 135, 144 (2005)
(footnote omitted).
18. See Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 722–23.
19. See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF JUDGMENTS §§ 5–9 (AM. LAW INST. 1942).
20. See Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 725–26.
21. See id. at 716–20.
22. As Professor Allan R. Stein and others have explained, “Pennoyer made no
distinction between cases related and unrelated to the forum. If the defendant was
present and served, he was subject to the state’s judicial authority for all purposes. If
the defendant was absent, his prior wrongdoing in the forum was irrelevant.” Allan R.
Stein, The Meaning of “Essentially at Home” in Goodyear Dunlop, 63 S.C. L. REV.
527, 534 (2012) (footnotes omitted); see also Arthur T. von Mehren & Donald T.
Trautman, Jurisdiction to Adjudicate: A Suggested Analysis, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1121,
1136 (1966) (explaining additional challenges with the distinctions).
23. The rise of the corporate form, whose non-corporeality failed to square with
the Pennoyer model, destabilized “the relatively simple Pennoyer model based on
physical presence . . . . Accordingly, to ask whether the person of the corporation was
physically present in the state at the time of service of process is something of a category mistake [that] was recognized by International Shoe.” See Stein, supra note 22, at
534–35; see also Philip B. Kurland, The Supreme Court, the Due Process Clause and
the In Personam Jurisdiction of State Courts—From Pennoyer to Denckla: A Review,
25 U. CHI. L. REV. 569, 577–86 (1958) (explaining the many challenges presented by
the rise of the corporate form).
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FAIRNESS

The modern era of due process analysis begins with Justice Stone’s
opinion in International Shoe Co. v. Washington.24 From the outset,
the opinion’s importance rests on its insistence that a court’s power
over the defendant’s person or property is not the central concern in
making the jurisdictional determination. Rather, the approach is to
determine under what circumstances a nonresident may be justly subjected to a local suit when the matter is considered in light of our
federal system of government and “traditional notions of fair play and
substantial justice.”25 The main difficulty with this more flexible approach is in translating the idea into a course of conduct in the particular contexts in which the problem is likely to arise.26
In International Shoe, the issue was whether a foreign corporation
was subject to the jurisdiction of the State of Washington as a result of
the conduct of its representatives who sold shoes in the state. In the
Court’s opinion, a new standard of fairness was born to deal with personal jurisdiction issues in the twentieth century:
But now that the capias ad respondendum has given way to personal service of summons or other form of notice, due process requires only that in order to subject a defendant to a judgment in
personam, if he be not present within the territory of the forum, he
have certain minimum contacts with it such that the maintenance of
the suit does not offend “traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.”27

The opinion reflects dissatisfaction with a purely quantitative evaluation of the nonresident’s activities. The determination of whether it is
fair to subject a nonresident to a local suit also depends upon the quality and nature of the activity. In given cases, when a nexus exists between the activity in the forum state and the litigation problem, the
forum state’s exercise of jurisdiction might be fair and reasonable
even though the activity is of a limited character because the nonresident enjoys the benefits and protections of the laws of the forum state
while conducting the activity there.28 On the other hand, substantial,
continuous, and systematic activity of a nonresident within the forum
24. Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
25. See id. at 316 (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)).
26. This flexibility arises from the fact that “International Shoe put a variety of
[new] topics on the table for assessing the constitutionality of personal jurisdiction,”
such as the defendant’s “minimum contacts” with the forum and the suit’s prosecution
in conformity with “traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.” Richard
D. Freer, Personal Jurisdiction in the Twenty-First Century: The Ironic Legacy of Justice Brennan, 63 S.C. L. REV. 551, 554 (2012).
27. See Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316 (emphasis added).
28. See id. at 318 (“[T]he commission of some single or occasional acts of the corporate agent in a state . . . because of their nature and quality and the circumstances
of their commission, may be deemed sufficient to render the corporation liable to
suit.” (citations omitted)).
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could also be sufficient to support the exercise of jurisdiction, even
when the activity did not give rise to the litigation.29 In these cases,
“the continuous corporate operations within a state were thought so
substantial and of such a nature as to justify suit against it on causes of
action arising from dealings entirely distinct from those activities.”30
The Due Process Clause, however, has never supported the exercise
of jurisdiction over a nonresident “with which the state has no contacts, ties, or relations.”31
Although the Court altered the jurisdictional analysis in International Shoe, the original formulation of the minimum contacts test was
not particularly helpful when concrete problems required its application.32 The significance of the decision has been its departure from the
tradition of a physical power conception of personal jurisdiction, but
as the commentators noted, “the ‘minimum contacts’ doctrine has the
merit of flexibility and the defect of vagueness.”33
After International Shoe, the Supreme Court decided several other
cases on the subject of the exercise of personal jurisdiction over nonresidents. In Travelers Health Ass’n v. Virginia,34 the Commonwealth
of Virginia sought enforcement of an order of the Virginia Corporation Commission requiring a mail order insurance company incorporated in Nebraska and having its only office in Omaha, Nebraska, to
cease solicitation of business in Virginia without obtaining authority
to do so under Virginia’s Blue Sky Law, which required proof of solvency and an agreement that suits can be filed against the insurance
29. See id. In an influential article, which is cited extensively in Goodyear Dunlop
Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, Professors von Mehren and Trautman note that:
[A]ffiliations between the forum and the underlying controversy normally
support only the power to adjudicate with respect to issues deriving from, or
connected with, the very controversy that establishes jurisdiction to adjudicate. This we call specific jurisdiction. On the other hand, American practice
. . . is to exercise power to adjudicate any kind of controversy when jurisdiction is based on relationships, direct or indirect, between the forum and the
person or persons whose legal rights are to be affected. This we call general
jurisdiction.
von Mehren & Trautman, supra note 22, at 1136.
30. See Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 318.
31. See id. at 319.
32. In assessing the International Shoe’s new standard of fairness, Justice Hugo
Black “criticized the injection of ‘uncertain elements’ and imprecise terms such as
‘fair play’ and ‘substantial justice’ . . . . His caution was born of fear that the Court
would use these open-ended concepts to restrict state-court jurisdiction.” See Freer,
supra note 26, at 554–56 (citing Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 323–25 (Black, J., concurring)).
Justice Black’s concern may have been rooted in his rather broad view of jurisdictionally sufficient contacts, which he confirmed in Travelers Health Ass’n v. Virginia, 339
U.S. 643, 647 (1950) and McGee v. International Life Insurance Co., 355 U.S. 220,
223–24 (1957). See id. at 555–56.
33. John A. Gorfinkel & Richard A. Lavine, Long-Arm Jurisdiction in California
Under New Section 410.10 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 21 HASTINGS L.J. 1163,
1164 (1970).
34. Travelers Health Ass’n v. Virginia, 339 U.S. 643 (1950).
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company in Virginia.35 The insurance company contested Virginia jurisdiction on the basis that its activities occurred in Nebraska, not Virginia. The Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed the Commission’s
cease and desist order.36 On appeal to the Supreme Court, in an opinion by Justice Hugo Black, a bare majority of the Court upheld the
exercise of jurisdiction by reasoning that “where business activities
reach out beyond one state and create continuing relationships and
obligations with citizens of another state, courts need not resort to
fictional ‘consent’ in order to sustain the jurisdiction of regulatory
agencies in the latter state.”37 The Supreme Court reasoned that the
insurer’s systematic and widespread solicitation of insurance business
in Virginia, its issuance of insurance certificates to Virginians, and the
burden on Virginia certificate holders of bringing suit in Nebraska
supported Virginia’s exercise of jurisdiction.38 Shortly thereafter, in
Perkins v. Benguet Consolidated Mining Co., the Court reiterated that
jurisdiction could be asserted against a nonresident when the cause of
action did not arise out of the nonresident’s activities within the forum
State if the nonresident’s activities in that state were “continuous and
systematic” and “substantial.”39
Five years later, in McGee v. International Life Insurance Co., another opinion written by Justice Black involving a nonresident insurance company that solicited business in the forum State, a personal
judgment in favor of a California resident was upheld by a California
court against a Texas-based insurance company because the company
sent a reinsurance certificate and premium statements to a policyholder who resided in California.40 At the time McGee was decided in
1957, the opinion was thought to support a very broad interpretation
of the minimum contacts doctrine such that virtually any contact
would support the exercise of jurisdiction over a nonresident.41 This
view was quickly eroded in 1958 by the Supreme Court’s elusive opinion in Hanson v. Denckla.42 In Hanson, the Court held that the minimum contacts test of International Shoe is not satisfied unless the
defendant “purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws.”43 Thereafter, until its 1977 opinion in Shaffer v.
35. Id. at 644–46.
36. Travelers Health Ass’n v. Commonwealth, 51 S.E.2d 263, 271 (Va. 1949), aff’d
339 U.S. 643 (1950).
37. Travelers Health Ass’n, 339 U.S. at 647. Based on International Shoe and other
cases, “the contacts and ties of [the insurance company] with Virginia residents, together with that state’s interest in the faithful observance of the certificate obligations,
justify subjecting [the company] to cease and desist proceedings.” Id. at 648.
38. Id. at 648–49.
39. Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437, 447–48 (1952).
40. McGee v. Int’l Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 221–23 (1957).
41. See Kurland, supra note 23, at 607.
42. Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958); see Kurland, supra note 23, at 620–22.
43. Hanson, 357 U.S. at 253.
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Heitner,44 the Supreme Court left the resolution of the “minimum
contacts” and “purposeful availment” conundrums to state and lower
federal courts.
IV. THE MINIMUM CONTACTS DOCTRINE AFTER
SHAFFER V. HEITNER
In a series of cases beginning in the late 1970s with Shaffer v. Heitner, the Supreme Court recast the minimum contacts doctrine and at
the same time extended its applicability to Pennoyer’s in rem wing.45
In Shaffer, a stockholder’s derivative action was instituted in Delaware against Greyhound Corporation and several of its officers who
were also stockholders of the corporation.46 For many of the individual defendants, no showing of any contact with Delaware was made
that would support a personal judgment against them. A Delaware
procedure called sequestration was used to constructively seize the individual defendants’ ownership interests in the Greyhound Corporation.47 This seizure was accomplished by placing stop transfer orders
on the corporation’s books. The Delaware trial court’s order clearly
indicated that the sequestration would be vacated as to any defendant
who personally appeared in the action.48 In other words, the stock was
held hostage to compel the personal appearance of the individual defendants who otherwise would forfeit their interests in Greyhound
Corporation.
After tracing the development of the minimum contacts doctrine
and quoting International Shoe, the Supreme Court recast the doctrine
in the following terms: “[T]he relationship among the defendant, the
forum, and the litigation, rather than the mutually exclusive sovereignty of the States on which the rules of Pennoyer rest became the
central concern of the inquiry into personal jurisdiction.”49
This new formulation of the minimum contacts doctrine modified
the original standard. The minimum contacts standard articulated in
International Shoe focuses on the defendant’s “minimum contacts”
with the forum State, that is, the relationship between the defendant
and the forum. By contrast, as recast in Shaffer, the modified standard
appears to place the relationship of the forum to the litigation—the
State’s interest in adjudicating the case in its courts—on an equal footing with the relationship between the defendant and the forum.50 On
the other hand, the balance of the Shaffer opinion and subsequent
44. Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
45. Id. at 207–08.
46. Id. at 189–90.
47. Id. at 190–92.
48. Id. at 190, 192–93.
49. Id. at 204.
50. William V. Dorsaneo, III, Due Process, Full Faith and Credit, and Family Law
Litigation, 36 SW. L.J. 1085, 1096–99 (1983).
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Supreme Court decisions suggest that the state’s interest must be particularly strong when the relationship of the defendant to the forum is
insubstantial.51
In Shaffer, it was argued that because the nonresident defendants
held positions as officers and directors of a corporation chartered in
Delaware, Delaware’s interest in supervising the management of the
corporation should give its courts jurisdiction over a stockholder’s derivative action even though the nonresidents had never set foot in
Delaware. In answering this contention, the Supreme Court made two
responses. First, the Court stated:
Delaware law bases jurisdiction, not on appellants’ status as corporate fiduciaries, but rather on the presence of their property in the
State. . . . If Delaware perceived its interest in securing jurisdiction
over corporate fiduciaries to be as great as Heitner suggests, we
would expect it to have enacted a statute more clearly designed to
protect that interest.52

Second, by accepting positions as officers and directors of a Delaware
corporation, the nonresidents “had no reason to expect to be haled
before a Delaware court.”53
The Supreme Court applied the minimum contacts doctrine next in
Kulko v. Superior Court.54 In Kulko, a mother brought suit in California against her ex-husband to obtain custody of two children and to
increase his child support obligations. Under a prior separation agreement, the children were to remain with the father most of the year and
spend vacations with the mother. The mother was to receive $3,000 for
the children’s support during the time they resided with her. Although
the parents had been married in California while Mr. Kulko was in the
armed forces, they lived as husband and wife in New York for thirteen
years. After they separated, she moved to California, and he stayed in
New York. The father voluntarily sent one of the children with her
belongings to California. The California courts considered this act sufficient to support the exercise of in personam jurisdiction over him
with respect to both children.55
The father did not contest the California court’s jurisdiction for the
purpose of the custody determination. The Supreme Court held that
the father’s purchase of a one-way plane ticket for his daughter so that
she could go to live with her mother was not sufficient to subject him
51. See id. One commentator has noted that “[t]he only basis our law has traditionally recognized for state authority over conduct unrelated to the state is the
unique relationship between a state and its citizens or residents,” which provides the
state with “a legitimate claim of authority over all of the defendant’s conduct, including conduct entirely unrelated to the state.” Meir Feder, Goodyear, “Home,” and the
Uncertain Future of Doing Business Jurisdiction, 63 S.C. L. REV. 671, 691 (2012).
52. Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 214–15.
53. Id. at 216.
54. Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84 (1978).
55. Id. at 86–88.
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to personal jurisdiction in California with respect to either child. The
Court relied heavily upon the limiting language quoted above from
Hanson v. Denckla regarding purposeful availment.56
From the standpoint of the defendant’s relationship to the forum,
the Kulko Court concluded that the father’s acquiescence in his
daughter’s desire to live with her mother did not constitute a purposeful act. The Court reasoned that “[a] father who agrees, in the
interests of family harmony and his children’s preferences, to allow
them to spend more time in California than was required under a separation agreement can hardly be said to have ‘purposefully availed
himself’ of the ‘benefits and protections’ of California’s laws.”57 Furthermore, the Supreme Court considered the act of acquiescing in the
daughter’s return an insufficient jurisdictional basis for two other reasons.58 First, the Court explained:
This single act is surely not one that a reasonable parent would expect to result in the substantial financial burden and personal strain
of litigating a child-support suit in a forum 3,000 miles away, and we
therefore see no basis on which it can be said that appellant could
reasonably have anticipated being “haled before a [California]
court.”59

Second, “the mere act of sending a child to California to live with her
mother is not a commercial act and connotes no intent to obtain or
expectancy of receiving a corresponding benefit in the State that
would make fair the assertion of that State’s judicial jurisdiction.”60
Regarding the relationship between the forum and the litigation,
the Court in Kulko recognized California’s legitimate interests, but
held that “California’s legitimate interest in ensuring the support of
children resident in California without unduly disrupting the children’s lives, moreover, is already being served by the State’s participa56. Id. at 93–94 (“The unilateral activity of those who claim some relationship
with a nonresident defendant cannot satisfy the requirement of contact with the forum State. . . . [I]t is essential in each case that there be some act by which the defendant purposefully avails [itself] of the privilege of conducting activities within the
forum State [thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws].” (first alteration
in original) (quoting Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958))).
57. Id. at 94. Justice Brennan dissented from the majority, disagreeing with how it
weighed the case’s facts and believing that the father’s “connection with the State of
California was not too attenuated” to sustain personal jurisdiction there. Id. at 102
(Brennan, J., dissenting).
58. Professor Freer notes that in Kulko: “[T]he Court stated the basic contact test
more narrowly than it had in Shaffer. Instead of looking for contact among the defendant, the forum, and the litigation, the focus was . . . ‘[a] sufficient connection between
the defendant and the forum State . . . .’ The majority found no such connection.” See
Freer, supra note 26, at 564 (footnote omitted) (quoting Kulko, 436 U.S. at 91).
59. Kulko, 436 U.S. at 97–98 (alteration in original) (quoting Shaffer v. Heitner,
433 U.S. 186, 216 (1977)).
60. Id. at 101.
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tion in the Revised Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act
of 1968.”61
After Kulko, World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson62 and
Rush v. Savchuk63 extended the interpretation of the new minimum
contacts formulation to commercial litigation. Of principal importance
are the sections of the World-Wide Volkswagen opinion that explain
the “haled before a court” foreseeability standard mentioned first in
Shaffer and restated in Kulko.64
In World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, the plaintiffs purchased an Audi in New York. The following year the plaintiffs were
injured during their move to Arizona when, “[a]s they passed through
the State of Oklahoma, another car struck their Audi in the rear.”65
They filed a products liability action in Oklahoma against the manufacturer, the importer, the regional distributor, and the retailer. The
retailer and the regional distributor made special appearances, which
were overruled.66
The Supreme Court determined that although it was foreseeable
that an automobile purchased in New York could arrive in Oklahoma
and cause injury there, this foreseeability was not the kind Due Process envisaged.67 To be relevant, a different type of foreseeability was
required:
This is not to say, of course, that foreseeability is wholly irrelevant. But the foreseeability that is critical to due process analysis is
not the mere likelihood that a product will find its way into the forum
State. Rather, it is that the defendant’s conduct and connection with
the forum State are such that he should reasonably anticipate being
haled into court there. The Due Process Clause, by ensuring the “orderly administration of the laws” gives a degree of predictability to
the legal system that allows potential defendants to structure their
primary conduct with some minimum assurance as to where that conduct will and will not render them liable to suit.68

With respect to the overall relationship between the defendant, the
forum, and the litigation, including the special interest of the forum in
adjudicating the controversy, the Court in World-Wide Volkswagen
further explains:
61. Id. at 98.
62. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980).
63. Rush v. Savchuk, 444 U.S. 320 (1980).
64. In World-Wide Volkswagen, the majority, led by Justice White, “embraced the
strongest defendant-centric focus yet.” Freer, supra note 26, at 565. Justice Brennan
dissented, asserting that the Court’s “new focus on foreseeability of suit in the forum
. . . gives the defendant a ‘veto power’ over jurisdiction, which is inappropriate in an
era in which jurisdiction is no longer based upon notions of implied consent.” Id. at
567 (citing World-Wide Volkswagen Corp., 444 U.S. at 312 (Brennan, J., dissenting)).
65. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp., 444 U.S. at 288.
66. Id. at 288 n.3.
67. Id. at 295.
68. Id. at 297 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
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The relationship between the defendant and the forum must be such
that it is “reasonable . . . to require the [defendant] to defend the
particular suit which is brought there.” Implicit in this emphasis on
reasonableness is the understanding that the burden on the defendant, while always a primary concern, will in an appropriate case be
considered in light of other relevant factors, including the forum
State’s interest in adjudicating the dispute; the plaintiff’s interest in
obtaining convenient and effective relief, at least when that interest
is not adequately protected by the plaintiff’s power to choose the
forum; the interstate judicial system’s interest in obtaining the most
efficient resolution of controversies; and the shared interest of the
several States in furthering fundamental substantive social
policies.69

V. BURGER KING’S TWO-PRONGED APPROACH
TO SPECIFIC JURISDICTION
Instead of embracing the recapitulated minimum contacts standard
devised in 1977 by the Supreme Court’s landmark decision in Shaffer
v. Heitner, by 1985 the Court rejuvenated the seminal “minimum contacts” language of the International Shoe opinion by creating a twopronged analytical framework in Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz.70
The Court obviously crafted both prongs under the influence of its
1980 opinion in World-Wide Volkswagen.71
The first prong of this framework examines whether the nonresident purposely directed activities at residents of the forum state or,
more generally, purposefully established minimum contacts with the
forum state.72 Under the second prong, after establishing that the defendant purposely established minimum contacts with the forum state,
the contacts are evaluated in light of other factors to determine
whether the assertion of personal jurisdiction comports with fair play
and substantial justice. These factors include:
[1] “the burden on the defendant,” [2] “the forum State’s interest in
adjudicating the dispute,” [3] “the plaintiff’s interest in obtaining
convenient and effective relief,” [4] “the interstate judicial system’s
interest in obtaining the most efficient resolution of controversies,”
and [5] the “shared interest of the several States in furthering fundamental substantive social policies.”73

Under the second prong, to avoid being subject to personal jurisdiction in the forum state, the nonresident defendant must present “a
compelling case that the presence of some other considerations would
69. Id. at 292 (first alteration in original) (citations omitted).
70. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 476–78 (1985).
71. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp., 444 U.S. at 291–92; see Freer, supra note 26, at
569 (citing Burger King Corp., 471 U.S. at 476–77).
72. Burger King Corp., 471 U.S. at 474–75.
73. Id. at 477 (quoting World-Wide Volkswagen Corp., 444 U.S. at 292).
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render jurisdiction unreasonable.”74 Thus, in most cases the exercise
of jurisdiction will comport with fair play and substantial justice when
the nonresident defendant has purposefully established minimum contacts with the forum state. In other words, under this approach, the
determination of purposeful minimum contacts normally will control
the outcome, except for cases in which the defendant is a resident of
another nation.75
Only two years later, the first prong of Burger King’s new analytical
framework proved itself inadequate to resolve the jurisdictional dilemma in an international “stream of commerce” case.76 In Asahi
Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court, the Supreme Court split down
the middle on the issue of the defendant’s purposeful minimum contacts with the forum state.77 Justice O’Connor’s plurality opinion, writing for four Justices, stated that “a defendant’s awareness that the
stream of commerce may or will sweep the product into the forum
State does not convert the mere act of placing the product into the
stream into an act purposefully directed toward the forum State.”78
Instead, purposeful availment requires evidence of “plus factors”
showing that the defendant was “seeking to serve” the market in the
forum state, such as “designing the product for the market in the forum State, advertising in the forum State, establishing channels for
providing regular advice to customers in the forum State, or marketing the product through a distributor who has agreed to serve as the
sales agent in the forum State.”79 Justice Brennan, also writing for
four justices, opined separately:
The stream of commerce refers not to unpredictable currents or eddies, but to the regular and anticipated flow of products from manufacture to distribution to retail sale. As long as a participant in this
process is aware that the final product is being marketed in the forum State, the possibility of a lawsuit there cannot come as a sur-

74. Id.
75. Id. at 477–78; see also Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102,
114 (1987) (“The unique burdens placed upon one who must defend oneself in a foreign legal system should have significant weight in assessing the reasonableness of
stretching the long arm of personal jurisdiction over national borders.”).
76. Asahi, 480 U.S. at 106, 109, 112; see Rhodes, supra note 17, at 188 (“A question not definitively resolved in World-Wide Volkswagen, . . . was the type of activities
that would constitute serving the market of a particular state. . . . The Court . . . only
provided some examples of sufficient forum marketing activities in dicta: making
sales, advertising, soliciting business, and delivering ‘products into the stream of commerce with the expectation that they will be purchased by consumers in the forum
State.’ The scope of this last activity, delivering goods into the stream of commerce,
generated debate in the lower courts” that the Court attempted but failed to resolve
in Asahi. (citing World-Wide Volkswagen Corp., 444 U.S. at 295–98)).
77. See Asahi, 480 U.S. at 105.
78. Id. at 112.
79. Id.
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prise. Nor will the litigation present a burden for which there is no
corresponding benefit.80

All nine justices agreed, however, that the exercise of jurisdiction
over Asahi in California was unreasonable under the second (“reasonableness”) prong of the jurisdictional test.81
The Supreme Court’s divided opinions in Burnham v. Superior
Court82 brought the Court’s second group of personal jurisdiction
opinions to a close, approving transient or “tag” jurisdiction on the
basis of its historical “pedigree,” as identified by Justice Scalia, as well
as considerations of foreseeability and fairness identified by Justice
Brennan, and principles of common sense.83 Thus, the second period
of post-Pennoyer decisions also ended in 1990 with considerable disagreement among the members of the Court on the most important
issue—the determination of whether the nonresident defendant’s conduct and connection with the forum state constitutes purposeful availment in satisfaction of the first prong of the jurisdictional test. As
explained in the next section of this Article, the Supreme Court did
not return to this issue or other aspects of personal jurisdiction jurisprudence for more than two decades.
VI. THE IMPACT OF THE SUPREME COURT’S MOST RECENT
PERSONAL JURISDICTION DECISIONS
A. Types of Personal Jurisdiction
Although Chief Justice Harlan Stone’s canonical opinion in the International Shoe case discusses them, the terms “specific jurisdiction”
and “general jurisdiction” have their genesis in an influential law review article.84 It was not until the Supreme Court’s decision in
Helicopteros Nacionales de Colom., S.A. v. Hall85 that the Court
adopted these terms to describe the types of personal jurisdiction, defining specific jurisdiction as “arising out of or related to the defendant’s contacts with the forum” and general jurisdiction as “personal
jurisdiction over a defendant in a suit not arising out of or related to
the defendant’s contacts with the forum.”86
The dividing line between specific jurisdiction and general jurisdiction is whether the cause of action brought against the nonresident
defendant arises from or relates to “the defendant’s contacts with the
forum state.”87 Despite its importance, however, this line is a hazy one
because the Supreme Court has declined to clarify how closely related
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.

Id. at 117 (Brennan, J., concurring).
Id. at 113–14, 116, 121–22.
Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604 (1990).
Id. at 610–11, 621–22, 629–30, 637–39.
von Mehren & Trautman, supra note 22, at 1136–83.
Helicopteros Nacionales de Colom., S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408 (1984).
Id. at 414 nn. 8–9.
Id. at 415.

2015] PERSONAL JURISDICTION IN A GLOBAL AGE

15

a cause of action must be to the defendant’s forum contacts to support
the exercise of specific jurisdiction. As explained below, in
Helicopteros the Supreme Court determined that the defendant’s limited contacts with Texas did not support the exercise of general jurisdiction by Texas courts.88 Because a majority of the Court concluded
that the parties did not argue the point, the majority opinion does not
address whether the plaintiffs’ wrongful death causes of action were
sufficiently related to the defendant’s limited contacts to support the
exercise of specific jurisdiction.89 By contrast, Justice Brennan’s dissenting opinion reasoned that the Court should have recognized the
“substantial difference” between “arise from” and “related to” and
that the plaintiffs’ wrongful death claims were “significantly related”
to the defendant’s Texas contacts, but without defining the breadth of
the “relate to” approach.90
In the absence of specific guidance from the Supreme Court, lower
courts have developed several possible ways to interpret and apply the
relatedness standard. In trying to define the “relate to” standard,
some courts have used a “but-for” test that is jurisdictionally expansive because it embraces every event in every jurisdiction that hindsight can logically identify as within the chain of causation between
the defendant’s contacts with the forum and the plaintiff’s cause of
action. Others adopted a considerably more restrictive and more complicated relatedness test, requiring the nonresident’s contacts to be
substantively relevant to an element of the plaintiff’s cause of action.
Some courts have applied a sliding scale of relatedness in which there
is an inverse relationship between the quantity of contacts and the
degree of relatedness (more related/fewer contacts required; less related/more contacts required). Another less popular approach uses a
“similarity” standard that allows specific jurisdiction principles to be
applied in every state where the nonresident defendant engaged in
similar activities.91
[It is] specific rather than general jurisdiction [that] accounts for the majority
of personal jurisdiction litigation.
Specific personal jurisdiction exists when defendant’s contacts are limited,
yet connected with the plaintiff’s claim such that the cause of action “arises
from or relates to” the defendant’s contacts with the forum. The connection
between the forum state, the defendant’s activities, and the cause of action
establish a court’s jurisdiction to adjudicate; therefore, a court’s jurisdiction
is limited, thus “specific,” to the related cause of action.
. . . [F]or a contact to qualify under this analysis, it must be a “purposeful
availment” by the defendant of the benefits of conducting activities within
the forum state or with the forum state residents.
Mark M. Maloney, Specific Personal Jurisdiction and the “Arise From or Relate to”
Requirement . . . What Does It Mean?, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1265, 1269–70 (1993)
(footnotes omitted).
88. Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 416.
89. See id. at 412–13.
90. Id. at 425–27 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
91. See generally Maloney, supra note 87, at 1276–81.
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For a prominent state court application/synthesis of these competing standards, in 2007, the Texas Supreme Court considered these
standards and concluded that “for a nonresident defendant’s forum
contacts to support an exercise of specific jurisdiction, there must be a
substantial connection between those contacts and the operative facts
of the litigation.”92
B. General Jurisdiction
Among the traditional bases for general jurisdiction are (1) an individual’s domicile in the forum state; (2) an individual’s physical presence in the forum state at the time of service there (“tag” jurisdiction);
(3) a corporation’s incorporation in the forum state; or (4) its registration to transact business in the forum combined with the appointment
of an agent for service of process.93 Until 1977, when the Supreme
Court demolished part of the in rem wing of Pennoyer v. Neff and
assimilated the remainder into the minimum contacts doctrine,94 the
presence of property in the forum state would also support general
jurisdiction over the property. Much of this law has been preserved.
But otherwise, the scope of general jurisdiction has been unclear for
many years because of the paucity of Supreme Court decisions on the
subject.
Until recently, two Supreme Court decisions controlled the analysis,
Perkins,95 the only case in which the Court upheld a finding of general
jurisdiction, and Helicopteros.96 In Perkins, the Supreme Court held
that Ohio properly exercised general jurisdiction over a Philippine
corporation that was sued in the state, where the corporation’s affairs
were overseen from Ohio during World War II such that the corporation maintained “continuous and systematic” and “substantial” general business contacts in Ohio.97 In Helicopteros, the Court held that
the exercise of general jurisdiction was improper in Texas courts in
wrongful death actions brought against a Colombian corporation by
92. Moki Mac River Expeditions v. Drugg, 221 S.W.3d 569, 585 (Tex. 2007); see
also Moncrief Oil Int’l Inc. v. OAO Gazprom, 414 S.W.3d 142, 157 (Tex. 2013)
(“[B]ut-for causation alone is insufficient.”).
93. There is a “sharp contrast” between the number of times that the Supreme
Court addressed specific and general jurisdictions. Whereas “[s]pecific jurisdiction . . .
has been the subject of numerous Supreme Court decisions since International Shoe,”
before the Court’s most recent decisions on the subject in Goodyear Dunlop Tires
Operations, S.A. v. Brown and in Daimler AG v. Bauman, general jurisdiction was
considered only twice, in Helicopteros Nacionoles de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S.
408 (1984), and in Perkins v. Benguet Consolidated Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437 (1952).
See Stein, supra note 22, at 533.
94. See Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 212 (1977) (“[A]ll assertions of statecourt jurisdiction must be evaluated according to the standards set forth in International Shoe and its progeny.”).
95. Perkins, 342 U.S. at 442–44.
96. Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 414.
97. See Perkins, 342 U.S. at 447–48.
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survivors of U.S. citizens who died in a helicopter crash in Peru.98
General jurisdiction was not proper in Texas because the corporation’s contacts “consisted of sending its chief executive officer to
Houston for a contract-negotiation session; accepting into its New
York bank account checks drawn on a Houston bank; purchasing helicopters, equipment, and training services . . . for substantial sums; and
sending personnel to [Texas] for training.”99 In this connection, the
Supreme Court explained that “mere purchases” of goods or services
in the forum state is no basis for the exercise of general, all-purpose,
dispute-blind jurisdiction.100
These two cases were generally interpreted as requiring the defendant’s contacts with the forum to be “continuous,” “systematic,” and
“substantial.” Because these simple words are subject to multiple interpretations, judicial interpretations of them were inconsistent, and
the scope of general jurisdiction was problematic.
In 2011, this relatively opaque guidance was clarified in Goodyear
Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, followed in 2014 by Daimler
AG v. Bauman.101 These two decisions restrict general jurisdiction to
a very limited number of situations, including a foreign corporation’s
state of incorporation and its principal place of business. In these decisions, the Supreme Court explained that “general jurisdiction requires
affiliations ‘so “continuous and systematic” as to render [the foreign
corporation] essentially at home in the forum State.’ . . . i.e., comparable to a domestic enterprise in that State.”102
Significantly, in Daimler the Court abandoned or recapitulated the
traditional test for general jurisdiction in the following terms:
Goodyear did not hold that a corporation may be subject to general jurisdiction only in a forum where it is incorporated or has its
principal place of business; it simply typed those places paradigm
all-purpose forums. Plaintiffs would have us look beyond the exemplar bases Goodyear identified, and approve the exercise of general
jurisdiction in every State in which a corporation “engages in a substantial, continuous, and systematic course of business.” That formulation, we hold, is unacceptably grasping.
. . . Accordingly, the inquiry under Goodyear is not whether a
foreign corporation’s in-forum contacts can be said to be in some
98. Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 418–19.
99. Id. at 416.
100. Id. at 418.
101. Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 751, 758 n.11 (2014); Goodyear
Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846 (2011). The Supreme Court
relied in part on Professors Brilmayer and Twitchell in both Goodyear and Daimler.
See Lea Brilmayer, A General Look at General Jurisdiction, 66 TEX. L. REV. 723, 728
(1988) (identifying domicile, place of incorporation, and principal place of business as
“paradigm bases” for the exercise of general jurisdiction); see also Mary Twitchell,
The Myth of General Jurisdiction, 101 HARV. L. REV. 610, 628, 635 (1988).
102. Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 758 n.11 (alteration in original).
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sense “continuous and systematic,” it is whether that corporation’s
“affiliations with the State are so ‘continuous and systematic’ as to
render [it] essentially at home in the forum State.”103

In addition, the general jurisdiction inquiry does not focus “solely
on the magnitude of the defendant’s in-state contacts.”104 Instead,
general jurisdiction requires “an appraisal of a corporation’s activities
in their entirety, nationwide and worldwide. A corporation that operates in many places can scarcely be deemed at home in all of them.
Otherwise, ‘at home’ would be synonymous with ‘doing business’ tests
framed before specific jurisdiction evolved in the United States.”105
Although Justice Sotomayor concurred in the judgment, she disagreed
with the Court’s new “nationwide and worldwide” perspective, by reasoning that “[t]he problem, the Court says, is not that Daimler’s contacts with California are too few, but that its contacts with other
forums are too many.”106 According to Justice Sotomayor, “[a] State
may subject a defendant to the burden of suit if the defendant has
sufficiently taken advantage of the State’s laws and protections
through its contacts in the State; whether the defendant has contacts
elsewhere is immaterial.”107
So (one might ask) where, other than Germany, is Daimler AG “at
home” and subject to general jurisdiction? Although this is not explained in the Court’s opinion,108 general (all-purpose) jurisdiction
over corporations and other similar business entities that have not
consented to suit in the forum State has clearly been severely limited,
especially in the international context, and of course these new limits
on general jurisdiction make specific jurisdiction’s reach more and
more important.
One byproduct of the Supreme Court’s recent decisions limiting the
breadth of general jurisdiction is the increased importance of state
statutes requiring foreign corporations and certain other business entities to register with the state, obtain a certificate of authority to transact intrastate business activities, and to appoint a registered agent to
accept service of process for the foreign business entity.109 For a number of years, in view of Shaffer v. Heitner’s probably overbroad assertion that “all assertions of state-court jurisdiction must be evaluated
103. Id. at 760–61 (alteration in original) (second emphasis added) (citation
omitted).
104. Id. at 767 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
105. Id. at 762 n.20 (majority opinion).
106. Id. at 764 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
107. Id.
108. See id. at 761 n.19 (majority opinion) (noting that the Court did not “foreclose
the possibility that . . . an exceptional case, see, e.g., Perkins,” might satisfy the new
“at home” test).
109. See, e.g., TEX. BUS. ORGS. CODE ANN. § 5.251 (West 2013) (designating Texas
Secretary of State as agent for service “of foreign filing entity” that transacts business
in Texas without being registered as required by statute); see also § 9.251 (listing activities that do not constitute “transaction of business” in Texas).
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according to the standards set forth in International Shoe and its progeny,”110 an increasing number of courts have held that a complete personal jurisdictional analysis must be conducted, even if the
corporation has registered to transact business in the forum state and
appointed a registered agent to accept service of process.111 Under
this analysis, even though the Texas Business Organizations Code and
the Texas general long-arm statute provide generally for the appointment of the secretary of state as the service agent for a foreign corporation that “is required by statute to designate or maintain a resident
[registered] agent or engages in business in this state,”112 these provisions are not sufficient for jurisdiction under a consent theory or
evolving principles of jurisdiction. On the other hand, if this analysis is
not correct, the Supreme Court’s recent decisions in the Goodyear
and Daimler cases would ironically make no difference to the outcome of jurisdictional disputes in a great many cases, only to the legal
basis (consent) for them.
C. Specific Jurisdiction
By far the greatest number of Supreme Court cases decided since
the International Shoe decision have grappled with the requirements
for specific jurisdiction. As explained by the Court in Burger King
Corp. v. Rudzewicz, under the minimum contacts analysis for specific
jurisdiction, courts must determine whether the nonresident defendant purposefully availed itself of the privilege of conducting activities
within the forum state or purposely directed out-of-state actions toward the forum state or residents of the forum state.113 Yet the concept of purposeful availment remains elusive, particularly in the
context of interstate and international commerce.114
Although the bench and bar anticipated that the Supreme Court
would ultimately resolve the split between the O’Connor and the
Brennan opinions in Asahi, twenty-four years after Asahi the Court’s
2011 opinions in J. McIntyre Machinery Ltd. v. Nicastro continued and
arguably exacerbated the division.115 In Nicastro, although there is no
110. Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 212 (1977).
111. See, e.g., Conner v. ContiCarriers & Terminals, Inc., 944 S.W.2d 405, 416 (Tex.
App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1997, no writ) (“A foreign corporation . . . cannot voluntarily consent to jurisdiction by compliance with the Texas registration statute unless
it is actually ‘doing business’ in Texas. By registering to do business, a foreign corporation only potentially subjects itself to jurisdiction.”); see also Wenche Siemer v.
Learjet Acquisition Corp., 966 F.2d 179, 181–82 (5th Cir. 1992). But see, e.g.,
Goldman v. Pre-Fab Transit Co., 520 S.W.2d 597, 597–98 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th
Dist.] 1975, no writ).
112. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 17.044(a)(1) (West 2013).
113. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 474–76 (1985).
114. Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102 (1987) (four to four
split between opinions authored by Justices O’Connor and Brennan).
115. J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780 (2011) (plurality opinion).
As Professor Arthur R. Miller laments:
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majority opinion, a plurality of the Court decided that a British manufacturer was not subject to jurisdiction in New Jersey because it did
not purposely avail itself of the privilege of conducting purposeful activities in or directed toward New Jersey, even though the British
manufacturer’s scrap metal machines were marketed in the United
States by an exclusive United States distributor that ultimately sold
one of the machines to a New Jersey company (Curcio Scrap
Metal).116 The machine was shipped from Ohio to New Jersey, where
its allegedly defective condition caused injury to Nicastro, a New
Jersey resident.117
The plurality opinion authored by Justice Kennedy reasoned that it
is only the British manufacturer’s “purposeful contacts with New
Jersey, not with the United States, that alone are relevant.”118 Hence,
even though the British manufacturer’s distributor agreed to sell its
machines in the United States and the manufacturer attended trade
shows in several states (but not in New Jersey), because it had no
office in New Jersey, owned no property there, and neither advertised
in nor sent any employees to New Jersey, the manufacturer did not
purposely avail itself of the New Jersey market.119
The plurality opinion refers to the stream of commerce as a metaphor and substitutes a largely new analysis (reminiscent of Pennoyer),
which abandons the “minimum contacts” doctrine’s traditional focus
on fairness and substitutes a new “general rule” under which “the exercise of judicial power is not lawful unless the defendant ‘purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the
forum State; thus invoking the benefits and protections of its
laws.’ ”120 Under this standard of “lawfulness,” the “principal inquiry
in cases of this sort is [to be] whether the defendant’s activities manifest an intention to submit to the power of a sovereign”121 rather than
Departing analytically and linguistically from its personal jurisdiction jurisprudence going back sixty-five years to the seminal decision in International
Shoe Corp. v. Washington, four Justices clearly signaled a contraction of that
reach. . . .
. . . That is why I view McIntyre as yet another procedural stop sign, this
one posted at the very genesis of the case. The McIntyre plurality opinion is
an open invitation to defense interests to exploit this stop sign for all it is
worth.
Arthur R. Miller, McIntyre in Context: A Very Personal Perspective, 63 S.C. L. REV.
465, 475–476 (2012) (footnotes omitted).
116. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. at 2784.
117. Id. at 2786.
118. Id. at 2790.
119. Id. at 2790–91.
120. Id. at 2785 (quoting Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958)).
121. Id. at 2788. Submission to the State’s authority under general jurisdiction can
be based on “explicit consent,” presence “at the time suit commences through service
of process,” “[c]itizenship or domicile,” or “incorporation or principal place of business for corporations.” Id. at 2787 (“Each of those examples reveals circumstances, or
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“the defendant’s ability to anticipate suit [that] renders the assertion
of jurisdiction fair”122:
Where a defendant “purposefully avails itself of the privilege of
conducting activities within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws,” it submits to the judicial power of
an otherwise foreign sovereign to the extent that power is exercised,
in connection with the defendant’s activities touching on the State.
In other words, submission through contact with and activity directed at a sovereign may justify specific jurisdiction “in a suit arising out of or related to the defendant’s contacts with the forum.”123

According to the plurality opinion:
[A] rule based on general notions of fairness and foreseeability is
inconsistent with the premises of lawful judicial power. . . .
. . . [J]urisdiction is in the first instance a question of authority
rather than fairness . . . . Furthermore, were general fairness considerations the touchstone of jurisdiction, a lack of purposeful availment might be excused where carefully crafted judicial procedures
could otherwise protect the defendant’s interests, or where the
plaintiff would suffer substantial hardship if forced to litigate in a
foreign forum. That such considerations have not been deemed controlling is instructive.124

Justice Breyer and Justice Alito concurred separately and explained
the plurality went too far in eschewing International Shoe’s fairness
standard:
The plurality seems to state strict rules that limit jurisdiction
where a defendant does not “inten[d] to submit to the power of a
sovereign” and cannot “be said to have targeted the forum.” But
what do those standards mean when a company targets the world by
a course of conduct, from which it is proper to infer an intention to benefit from and
thus an intention to submit to the laws of the forum State.”).
122. Id. at 2788 (“It was the premise of [Justice Brennan’s] concurring opinion [in
Asahi] that the defendant’s ability to anticipate suit renders the assertion of jurisdiction fair. In this way, the opinion made foreseeability the touchstone of jurisdiction.”).
123. Id. at 2787–88 (citation omitted).
124. Id. at 2789 (citing World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286,
294 (1980)). Professor Miller also remarks:
It now appears that a corporate defendant may be able to structure its distribution system and send products to all fifty states, while avoiding the reach
of any, or almost any, individual state’s courts. No longer would injured consumers and employees be free to bring cases where they receive defective
products or services, or live, or were injured; rather, plaintiffs might have to
litigate in distant fora, and possibly in other countries, or abandon their
claims altogether.
....
. . . McIntyre offers a heightened prospect of a dismissal for lack of
jurisdiction. . . .
We are moving toward a system in which an increasing number of civil
actions may be stillborn.
Miller, supra note 115, at 475–76.
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selling products from its Web site? And does it matter if, instead of
shipping the products directly, a company consigns the products
through an intermediary (say, Amazon.com) who then receives and
fulfills the orders? And what if the company markets its products
through popup advertisements that it knows will be viewed in the
forum? . . .
. . . [We] do not agree with the plurality’s seemingly strict nojurisdiction rule . . . .125

But the concurring justices concluded nonetheless that “[n]one of
our precedents finds that a single isolated sale, even if accompanied
by the kind of sales effort indicated here, is sufficient. Rather, this
Court’s previous holdings suggest the contrary.”126
Justice Ginsburg, joined by Justices Sotomayor and Kagan, dissented. The dissenters saw nothing unfair about requiring an “international seller to defend at the place its products cause injury . . . . as an
incident of its efforts to develop a market for its industrial machines
anywhere and everywhere in the United States.”127 So what do the
opinions handed down in Nicastro tell us about specific jurisdiction
other than that the number of Supreme Court Justices favoring Justice
Brennan’s approach has been reduced from four in Asahi to three in
Nicastro? The combination of the plurality opinion and the concurrence tells us that a majority of the Supreme Court has rejected Justice Brennan’s relatively broad view of jurisdictionally sufficient
contacts in favor of an increasingly narrower interpretation of purposeful availment.128
In 2014, in Walden v. Fiore,129 the Supreme Court’s most recent specific jurisdiction case, a unanimous Supreme Court restrictively interpreted the “effects test” and its earlier opinion in Calder v. Jones.130 In
Walden, the Supreme Court explained that in Calder the assertion of
125. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. at 2793 (Breyer, J., concurring) (first alteration in original)
(citation omitted).
126. Id. at 2792 (citing World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286
(1980)); see Cody Jacobs, A Fork in the Stream: The Unjustified Failure of the Concurrence in J. McIntyre Machinery Ltd. v. Nicastro to Clarify the Stream of Commerce
Doctrine, 12 DEPAUL BUS. & COM. L.J. 171, 189–92 (2014).
127. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. at 2800 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). The dissent also opined
that the plurality opinion “would take a giant step away from the ‘notions of fair play
and substantial justice’ underlying International Shoe.” Id. at 2804 (quoting Int’l Shoe
Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945)).
128. See Ainsworth v. Moffett Eng’g, Ltd., 716 F.3d 174, 178 (5th Cir. 2013) (When
no single rationale enjoys the assent of five justices, “the holding of the Court may be
viewed as that position taken by those members who concurred in the judgments on
narrowest grounds.”) (citing Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977)). In
Nicastro, it is Justice Breyer’s opinion, which explains that under the Court’s precedents “ ‘a single isolated sale’ is not an adequate basis for personal jurisdiction.” Id.
(quoting Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. at 2792 (Breyer, J., concurring)); see also AFTG-TG,
LLC v. Nuroton Tech. Corp., 689 F.3d 1358, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
129. Walden v. Fiore, 134 S. Ct. 1115 (2014).
130. Id. at 1123–24 (discussing Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 787 n.6 (1984)).
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jurisdiction over the individual defendants in a libel case was proper
because the libel claims were based on an article written and edited by
the individual defendants for publication in the National Enquirer, a
national weekly newspaper with a California circulation of roughly
600,000, in reliance on phone calls from Florida to “California
sources” for the information in the article, which was about the plaintiff’s activities in California.131 Accordingly, the Supreme Court determined that:
The crux of Calder was that the reputation-based “effects” of the
alleged libel connected the defendants to California, not just to the
plaintiff. . . . In this way, the “effects” caused by the defendants’
article—i.e., the injury to the plaintiff’s reputation in the estimation
of the California public—connected the defendants’ conduct to California, not just to a plaintiff who happened to live there. That connection, combined with the various facts that gave the article a
California focus, sufficed to authorize the California court’s exercise
of jurisdiction.132

It remains to be seen whether the Court’s opinion in Walden will
have a significant impact on personal jurisdiction jurisprudence. But
the Court’s general statement in Walden that “our ‘minimum contacts’
analysis looks to the defendant’s contacts with the forum State itself,
not the defendant’s contacts with persons who reside there,” coupled
with other statements in the opinion, may be intended to establish a
more rigorous or more demanding version of purposeful availment for
effects test cases.133 This new standard would require a nonresident to
direct out-of-state activities that cause harmful effects in the forum
State, not merely at one or a few persons who happen to reside there,
but only when the nonresident defendant’s contacts connect the defendant with the forum State in some more “meaningful way,” even if
the out-of-state activities constitute intentional torts.134 Under this
analysis, for jurisdictional purposes, Calder is not about the harm suffered by Shirley Jones but about the extent of the defendant’s contacts
and connection with California.135
One potential consequence of the Court’s opinion may be the reduction or elimination of specific jurisdiction in interstate and international commercial litigation cases involving fraud or misrepresentation
131. Id. at 1123.
132. Id. at 1123–24.
133. Id. at 1122.
134. Id. at 1123, 1125 (“These same principles apply when intentional torts are involved. . . . A forum State’s exercise of jurisdiction over an out-of-state intentional
tortfeasor must be based on intentional conduct by the defendant that creates the
necessary contacts with the forum. . . . The proper question is not where the plaintiff
experienced a particular injury or effect but whether the defendant’s conduct connects him to the forum in a meaningful way.”).
135. Id. at 1125 (“Calder made clear that mere injury to a forum resident is not a
sufficient connection to the forum.”).
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claims or the commission of other deceptive trade practices by longdistance, unless the nonresident defendant is otherwise connected to
the forum State based on the defendant’s preexisting or resulting affiliation with the forum State and not based on the nonresident defendant’s “ ‘random,’ ‘fortuitous,’ or ‘attenuated’ contacts . . . or of the
‘unilateral activity’ ” of the plaintiff or plaintiffs or someone else.136
Another more significant potential consequence is the elevation of
the requirements for satisfaction of the purposeful availment prong of
Burger King’s analytical framework more generally, whenever the defendant does not regularly engage or plan to engage in substantial activities purposefully directed toward the forum State. In other words,
additional contacts with the forum state may be needed to bolster the
exercise of specific jurisdiction.137 Under this analysis, cases like McGee v. International Life Insurance Co. would probably fail to meet
the standard.138
On the other hand, Walden possibly came out the way it did simply
because the Court unanimously concluded that Agent Walden’s contacts with Nevada were simply too “ ‘random,’ ‘fortuitous,’ or ‘attenuated’ ” to justify jurisdiction.139 Even if Walden intended to injure the
plaintiffs, he did not “aim” any conduct at Nevada.140 Viewed this
way, Walden is arguably more like World-Wide Volkswagen141 than
Calder. As a result, Walden may not have much of an effect on personal jurisdiction jurisprudence in many other cases, including cases of
interstate and international fraud, misrepresentation, or deceptive
trade practices.142 Unfortunately, this conservative interpretation of
the Court’s opinion in Walden may rest more on wishful thinking
rather than on the language of the opinion itself.
136. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 475 (1985) (citations omitted).
137. Cf. Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846, 2855
(2011) (“Flow of a manufacturer’s products into the forum, we have explained, may
bolster an affiliation germane to specific jurisdiction.”).
138. McGee v. Int’l Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957).
139. Walden, 134 S. Ct. at 1123–24.
140. Id. at 1124 (“Petitioner never traveled to, conducted activities within, contacted anyone in, or sent anything or anyone to Nevada.”).
141. See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 295 (1980)
(“[W]e find in the record before us a total absence of those affiliating circumstances
that are a necessary predicate to any exercise of state-court jurisdiction.”).
142. It is also worth noting that the Supreme Court’s opinion in Walden quotes a
statement in the Court’s prior opinion in Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., another
libel case decided at the same time as Calder, that “[t]he tort of libel is generally held
to occur wherever the offending material is circulated.” Keeton v. Hustler Magazine,
Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 777 (1984)). This statement was made in Keeton to justify the exercise of jurisdiction over Hustler because a lot of its magazines were sold in New
Hampshire and, therefore, the tort was committed in New Hampshire. See Walden,
134 S. Ct. at 1123–24. The same elemental reasoning process could be used to justify
jurisdiction in business tort and contract cases involving wrongful conduct directed at
the forum State rather than based on the defendant’s “ ‘random,’ ‘fortuitous,’ or ‘attenuated’ contacts” with the forum or resulting from the “unilateral activity” of the
plaintiff or someone else.
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VII. IMPUTED CONTACTS; JURISDICTIONAL VEIL-PIERCING
Another important aspect of personal jurisdiction jurisprudence is
the circumstances under which one person’s or one entity’s contacts
can be imputed to another person or entity for the purpose of jurisdictional veil-piercing. This issue was raised belatedly in Goodyear, but
the Court refused to address it because the contention was not addressed in the North Carolina Court of Appeals or in the respondents’
brief in opposition to the petition for certiorari.143 Similarly, in
Daimler AG v. Bauman, the Supreme Court not only rejected the
Ninth Circuit’s attribution of the California contacts of MBUSA, a
Delaware limited liability company and indirect subsidiary of
Daimler, to Daimler based on an agency theory, but the Court also
refused to conclude that there would be a basis for general jurisdiction
over Daimler in California, even assuming “that MBUSA [was] at
home in California” and that its “contacts [were] imputable to
Daimler.”144 Under these circumstances, the Court simply stated that
“[t]his Court has not yet addressed whether a foreign corporation may
be subjected to a court’s general jurisdiction based on the contacts of
its in-state subsidiary.”145
Based on prior Supreme Court decisions, however, it is not anticipated that the Supreme Court will look favorably on the concept of
judicial veil-piercing.146 For example, in Keeton, the Supreme Court
explained that “jurisdiction over a parent corporation [does not] automatically establish jurisdiction over a wholly owned subsidiary. Each
defendant’s contacts with the forum State must be assessed individually.”147 Similarly, in 1925 the Supreme Court explained that as long
as the subsidiary is maintained as “a distinct corporate entity” and
“[a]ll transactions between the two corporations are [conducted] as if
the two were wholly independent corporations,” then “the corporate
separation . . . was real. It was not pure fiction.”148
Following Cannon Manufacturing Co. v. Cudahy Packing Co., the
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in Hargrave v. Fibreboard Corp. ex143. Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846, 2857–58
(2011).
144. Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 760 (2014).
145. Id. at 759.
146. As Professor Lonny S. Hoffman observes:
[V]eil piercing has been the subject of searching criticism. It has been derisively called many things: “unprincipled,” “defy[ing] any attempt at rational
explanation,” “not entirely comprehensible,” “dysfunctional,” and “freakish[ ].” Whittled down to their essential core, the critiques of jurists and corporate law scholars may be described as two-fold: veil piercing is
indeterminate and, worse still, irrelevant to the harm caused to the victims
the doctrine was ostensibly designed to protect.
Lonny Sheinkopf Hoffman, The Case Against Vicarious Jurisdiction, 152 U. PA. L.
REV. 1023, 1075–76 (2004) (first alteration added) (footnotes omitted).
147. Keeton, 465 U.S. at 781 n.13 (citations omitted).
148. Cannon Mfg. Co. v. Cudahy Packing Co., 267 U.S. 333, 335, 337 (1925).
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plained that “our cases demand proof of control by the parent over
the internal business operations and affairs of the subsidiary in order
to fuse the two for jurisdictional purposes.”149 The Texas Supreme
Court, among others, has taken the same approach.150
VIII. VIRTUAL CONTACTS

AND

INTERNET ISSUES

A. Guidance from the Supreme Court
The Supreme Court does not want to talk about virtual contacts yet.
In Walden, in response to the respondents’ argument that the Court’s
failure to find that the petitioner lacked minimum contacts with Nevada will result in “unfairness in cases where intentional torts are
committed via the Internet or other electronic means (e.g., fraudulent
access of financial accounts or ‘phishing’ schemes),” the Court stated
that “this case does not present the very different questions whether
and how a defendant’s virtual ‘presence’ and conduct translate into
‘contact’ with a particular State. . . . We leave questions about virtual
contacts for another day.”151
Similarly, in Nicastro the plurality chose not to address new issues
posed by the changing global economy.152 In their concurring opinion,
Justices Breyer and Alito noted that these developments might require changes in the Court’s personal jurisdiction jurisprudence, explaining, however, that this was not the case in which to do so. As
Justice Breyer’s concurrence states, “I do not doubt that there have
been many recent changes in commerce and communication, many of
which are not anticipated by our precedents. But this case does not
present any of those issues.”153
So for the foreseeable future state and federal judges and the lawyers who appear before them will be required to conduct their own
analysis of these questions.
B. General Jurisdiction and Virtual Contacts
Although some early cases held that an Internet presence on computer websites was a type of “continuous and systematic” activity in
the forum State sufficient for general jurisdiction, these cases are almost certainly incorrect.
Even before Daimler, most courts ruled that the fact that a corporation uses a website to conduct business via the Internet is not sufficient to establish general jurisdiction. For example, Texas courts have
held that the fiction that a nonresident defendant’s maintenance or
149. Hargrave v. Fibreboard Corp., 710 F.2d 1154, 1160 (5th Cir. 1983).
150. See PHC-Minden, LP v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 235 S.W.3d 163, 173–76 (Tex.
2007) (Jefferson, C.J.).
151. Walden v. Fiore, 134 S. Ct. 1115, 1125 n.9 (2014).
152. See J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780 (2011).
153. Id. at 2791 (Breyer, J., concurring).
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use of a website can be accessed by a computer in Texas is not sufficient to create the kind of contacts needed for general jurisdiction.154
Similarly, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals has yet to find that Internet-based contacts establish general jurisdiction.155
Likewise, courts around the country have routinely rejected attempts to assert general jurisdiction based on website activities even
before Daimler.156
If anything, because the Supreme Court’s opinion in Daimler appears to virtually eliminate general jurisdiction for business entities
except for places in which a corporation is incorporated or where it
has its principal place of business, it is even more unlikely that courts
will find Internet-based contacts establish general jurisdiction.
C. Specific Jurisdiction and Zippo
Specific jurisdiction cases present larger difficulties. One popular
test for jurisdiction based on Internet-based contacts is the sliding
scale test first articulated in Zippo Manufacturing Co. v. Zippo Dot
Com, Inc.157 Zippo established a sliding scale of Internet activity test
in a case involving the potential exercise of specific jurisdiction.158 Although this sliding scale test has been applied in connection with the
154. See, e.g., Choice Auto Broker, Inc. v. Dawson, 274 S.W.3d 172, 177–78 (Tex.
App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2008, no pet.).
155. See, e.g., Bowles v. Ranger Land Sys., Inc., 527 F. App’x 319, 321–22 (5th Cir.
2013) (unpublished) (holding that a defendant’s website that can be accessed in Texas
and contain e-mail addresses for several of defendant’s employees was insufficient to
establish general jurisdiction).
156. See, e.g., Tamburo v. Dworkin, 601 F.3d 693, 701 (7th Cir. 2010) (holding that
Illinois could not exercise general personal jurisdiction over website owners in business operator’s tort action against website owners); Bird v. Parsons, 289 F.3d 865, 874
(6th Cir. 2002) (“[T]he fact that Dotster maintains a website that is accessible to anyone over the Internet is insufficient to justify general jurisdiction.”).
157. Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1119, 1124 (W.D. Pa.
1997).
158. Professor Michael A. Geist remarks:
One of the primary reasons for the early widespread support for the
Zippo test was the desire for increased legal certainty for Internet jurisdiction issues. While the test may not have been perfect, supporters felt it offered a clear standard that would allow businesses to conduct effective legal
risk analysis and make rational choices with regard to their approach to the
Internet.
In the final analysis, however, the Zippo test simply does not deliver the
desired effect. First, the majority of websites are neither entirely passive nor
completely active. . . .
Second, distinguishing between passive and active sites is complicated by
the fact that some sites may not be quite what they seem. . . .
Third, it is important to note that the standards for what constitutes an
active or passive website are constantly shifting. . . .
Fourth, the Zippo test is ineffective even if the standards for passive and
active sites remain constant.
Michael A. Geist, Is There a There There? Toward Greater Certainty for Internet Jurisdiction, 16 BERKLEY TECH. L.J. 1345, 1378–80 (2001).
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general jurisdiction inquiries, Zippo’s “scale does more work with specific jurisdiction” and “is not well adapted to the general jurisdiction
inquiry.”159 On one end of the scale is a “ ‘passive’ website, one that
merely allows the owner to post information on the internet [sic].”160
A passive website is not enough to establish personal jurisdiction. On
the other side of the scale are interactive sites, “sites whose owners
engage in repeated online contacts with forum residents over the internet [sic], and in these cases personal jurisdiction may be proper.”161
If a website falls somewhere in between, “the exercise of jurisdiction
is determined by the level of interactivity and commercial nature of
the exchange of information that occurs on the Website [sic].”162
Under the sliding scale, maintaining an interactive website can
amount to purposeful availment while the passive website does not.
By contrast, other courts and commentators have concluded that
Zippo’s approach should not be used as a shortcut that replaces traditional doctrine.163
IX. CONCLUSION
Like its predecessors, the Supreme Court’s third group of decisions
addresses the standards for both general and specific jurisdiction. But
this time the Court’s opinions not only fail to clarify personal jurisdiction jurisprudence, the opinions deemphasize the basic standard of
fairness on which the minimum contacts doctrine has rested from its
inception.
With respect to general jurisdiction, the Court identifies only two
“paradigm all-purpose forums” that have general jurisdiction over a
nonresident business entity, the nonresident’s place of incorporation
and its principal place of business, but without providing additional
guidance. At the same time, the Supreme Court expressly rejects the
prior conventional view that general jurisdiction should exist in any
forum where “a corporation engages in a substantial, continuous and
systematic course of business.” Further, by fixing the location of a corporation’s principal place of business based on its “nationwide” or
“worldwide” corporate activities, the Court appears to have narrowed
the scope of general jurisdiction even more, conceivably restricting it
to one or two forums. Under this approach, there is also no need to
159. Revell v. Lidov, 317 F.3d 467, 471 (5th Cir. 2002).
160. Id. at 470.
161. Id.
162. Mink v. AAAA Dev. LLC, 190 F.3d 333, 336 (5th Cir. 1999) (quoting Zippo,
952 F. Supp. at 1124).
163. See, e.g., Caiazzo v. Am. Royal Arts Corp., 73 So. 3d 245, 255 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 2011) (“[R]igid adherence to the Zippo test is likely to lead to erroneous results.” (quoting Hy Cite Corp. v. Badbusinessbureau.com, LLC, 297 F. Supp. 2d 1154,
1160 (W.D. Wis. 2004))). See generally A. Benjamin Spencer, Jurisdiction and the Internet: Returning to Traditional Principles to Analyze Network-Mediated Contacts,
2006 U. ILL. L. REV. 71.
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conduct any separate analysis of whether the exercise of general jurisdiction is consistent with traditional notions of fair play or substantial
justice, considering the interests of claimants in obtaining convenient
and effective relief or the interest of forum states in adjudicating disputes involving interstate and international business entities.
With respect to specific jurisdiction, the Court’s recent decisions
present a confusing picture resulting from the Court’s current doctrinal struggles concerning retention of International Shoe’s traditional
standard of fairness rather than the adoption of newer principles of
sovereignty reminiscent of Pennoyer’s simple rules. In addition, the
Court appears to have adopted a regressive recapitulation of specific
jurisdiction doctrine in ways that maximize the threshold concept of
purposeful availment and minimize the relevance of the interests of
claimants and the interests of American states in providing forums for
resident claimants against nonresidents.
As a result, restrictions on the exercise of specific jurisdiction as
well as the Court’s reluctance to expand its use to jurisdictions and
markets where multinational corporations conduct commercial activities make the availability of specific jurisdiction more problematic and
render our “traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice” less
and less recognizable.

